

BLACK HOLE ATTACK IN AODV & FRIEND FEATURES¹ UNIQUE EXTRACTION TO DESIGN DETECTION ENGINE FOR INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM IN MOBILE ADHOC NETWORK

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Abstract

Ad-hoc network is a collection of nodes that are capable to form dynamically a temporary network without the support of any centralized fixed infrastructure. Since there is no central controller to determine the reliable & secure communication paths in Mobile Adhoc Network, each node in the ad hoc network has to rely on each other in order to forward packets, thus highly cooperative nodes are required to ensure that the initiated data transmission process does not fail. In a mobile ad hoc network (MANET) where security is a crucial issue and they are forced to rely on the neighbor node, trust plays an important role that could improve the number of successful data transmission. Larger the number of trusted nodes, higher successful data communication process rates could be expected. In this paper, Black Hole attack is applied in the network, statistics are collected to design intrusion detection engine for MANET Intrusion Detection System (IDS). Feature extraction and rule inductions are applied to find out the accuracy of detection engine by using support vector machine. In this paper True Positive generated by the detection engine is very high and this is a novel approach in the area of Mobile Adhoc Intrusion detection system.

Keywords: Black hole attack, Denial of service attack, Detection engine,
Intrusion detection system, Friend features, Mobile Adhoc network.

1. Introduction

Intrusion detection is a security technology that attempts to identify individuals who are trying to break into and misuse a system without authorization and those who

¹ Features are called as friend features because after detecting the intruders we are not punishing the node, we only foster the trusted nodes after applying the voting mechanism.

have legitimate access to the system but are abusing their privileges [1]. An intrusion detection system (IDS) dynamically monitors the system and user actions in the network in order to detect intruders. Because an information system can pursue from various kinds of security vulnerabilities, it is both technically difficult and economically costly to build and maintain a system which is not susceptible to attacks. Experience teaches us never to rely on a single defensive line or technique. IDSs, by analyzing the system and user operations in search of activity undesirable and suspicious, can effectively monitor and protect against threats.

Research on IDSs began with a report by Anderson [2] followed by Denning's seminal paper [3], which lays the foundation for most of the current intrusion detection prototypes. Since then, many research efforts have been devoted to wired Intrusion Detection Systems. Numerous detection techniques and architecture for host machines and wired networks have been proposed. A good taxonomy of wired IDSs is presented in [4].

With the rapid proliferation of wireless networks and mobile computing applications, new vulnerabilities that do not exist in wired networks have appeared. Security poses a serious challenge in deploying wireless networks in reality. However, the vast difference between wired and wireless networks make traditional intrusion detection techniques inapplicable. Wireless IDSs, emerging as a new research topic, aim at developing new architecture and mechanisms to protect the wireless networks.

In MANETs, intrusion prevention and intrusion detection techniques need to complement each other to guarantee a highly secure environment. They play different roles in different status of the network. Intrusion prevention measures, such as encryption and authentication, are more useful in preventing outside attacks. Once the node is compromised, intrusion prevention system will have little effect in protecting the network, in this situation, the role of intrusion detection is more important. When a node is compromised, the attacker owns all its cryptographic key information. Therefore, encryption and authentication cannot defend against a trusted but malicious user. Type of attacks possible in Mobile Adhoc network is given in Table 1.

Table 1. List of UTC and APF.

| Unfair use of the transmission channel (UTC) | Anomalies in Packet Forwarding (APF) |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ignoring the MAC protocol • Jamming the transmission channel with garbage • Ignoring the bandwidth reservation scheme • Malicious flooding • Network Partition • Sleep Derivation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Drop packets • Blackhole Attack • Gray hole Attack • Delay packet transmissions • Wormhole Attack • Packet dropping • Routing Loop • Denial of Service (DoS) • Fabricated route messages • False Source Route • Cache Poisonings • Selfishness • Spoofing |

In this paper black hole attack is applied in Mobile Adhoc Network, In black hole attack [5-7], a malicious node uses its routing protocol in order to advertise itself for having the shortest path to the destination node or to the packet it wants

to intercept. In this way attacker node will always have the availability in replying to the route request and thus attract the whole traffic of the network & intercept the data packet and further it may retain it or drop it.

2. Related Work

Reputation based schemes detect misbehaving nodes and notify other nodes of the misbehaving nodes. Incentive based approaches aims to promote positive behavior to foster cooperation instead of relying on participants to report and punish misbehaving nodes. Otrok, et al. [8], Davis et al. [9], Yan et al. [10], and Kong et al. [11] have developed a distributed and cooperative intrusion detection system (IDS) where individual IDS agents are placed on each and every node. Each IDS agent runs independently, detects intrusion from local traces and initiates response.

Bhargava and Agrawal [12] have extended the IDS model described in [13] to enhance the security in AODV (Ad-hoc on demand Distance Vector) routing protocol. Watchdog [14] proposes to monitor packet forwarding on top of source routing protocols like DSR. Watchdog has the limitations of relying on overhearing packet transmissions of neighboring nodes for detecting anomalies in packet forwarding. Kong et al. [11] follow the concept of [14] but work with ADOV. They add a next hop field in AODV packets so that a node can be aware of the correct next hop of its neighbors. They also considers more types of attacks, such as packet modification, packet duplication, and packet-jamming DoS attacks. Balakrishnan et al. [15] have proposed a way to detect packet dropping in ad-hoc networks. Trust features [10, 16-22] in existing trust-based routing schemes for MANET.

The model in [23] is derived from previous research provide evidence on how a friendship mechanism could be used to improve the accuracy of IDS in MANET [17]. This model is extended in [24] to design the attack possible using TCP protocol, right now it is not needed in Mobile Adhoc Network but only for the sake of future extensions and possibilities and in [25] intrusion detection system for Denial of service attack. Ibrahim [26] introduced a hierarchical off-line anomaly network intrusion detection system based on Distributed Time-Delay Artificial Neural Network is introduced. The results indicate that dynamic neural nets (Distributed Time-Delay Artificial Neural Network) can achieve a high detection rate, where the overall accuracy classification rate average is equal to 97.24%.

One of the main issues in MANET IDS is the number of false alarms raised in the network as a result of false claims/reports made by individual nodes. This anonymity problem is a big challenge in MANET because it is difficult for nodes to distinguish between trusted and un-trusted nodes in such autonomous networks.

3. Proposed Frame Work

In [23] some assumptions that each node has a list of initial trust given in Table 2, and that will be shared with the other nodes present in the network these initial trust list can be generated on behalf of profile database shown in Fig. 1. These initial lists are known as Direct Friend Mechanism (DFM). Description about

complete model like Gids (Fig 2.), Lids, node initial Trust, Indirect Trust, Feedback Table can be accessed from [23].

Table 2. Node's Initial Trust.

| Node ID | Initial Trust | Node ID | Initial Trust |
|---------|---------------|---------|---------------|
| A | B & C | D | C,B |
| B | C,D,E | E | A,C |
| C | A,D,B | | |




Fig. 1. Local Intrusion Detection System (Lids) [23].




Fig. 2. Global Intrusion Detection System (Gids) [23].

3.1. IDS alarm analysis

This provides four possible results for each traffic trace analyzed by the IDS

True Positive (TP): when the attack succeeded and the IDS was able to detect it

$$(\text{Success} \wedge \text{Detection})$$

True Negative (TN): when the attack failed and the IDS did not report it

$$(\neg \text{Success} \wedge \neg \text{Detection})$$

False Positive (FP): when the attack failed and the IDS reported on it

$$(\neg \text{Success} \wedge \text{Detection})$$

False Negative (FN): when the attack succeeded and the IDS was not able to detect it

$$(\text{Success} \wedge \neg \text{Detection})$$

And accuracy of the IDS system is based on above mentioned parameters.

$$\text{Accuracy of the System} = (\text{TP} + \text{TN}) / (\text{TP} + \text{TN} + \text{FP} + \text{FN});$$

In [23], IDS model is divided into two sub-models one is Local IDS and another is Global IDS and they follow the 20:80 Rule to speed up their detection rate. In Lids the thresh hold values is set very high in the detection engine to detect the highly malicious node. Lids use Table 3 Feed Back Table (FBT) to provide the collective result from unfair use of Transmission channel based detection engine (UDE) and Anomaly Based Detection Engine (ADE) [23]. Profile data base will maintain the trusted neighbor list generated by Lids and this list is again used in Gids for rigorous checking for rest of the rules in which Threshold value of detection engine is set to detect normal intruder behavior.

Table 3. Feed Back Table (FBT).

| UDE | ADE | Value |
|-----|-----|-------|
| 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 1 | 1 | 1 |

After completing the detection engine process data collected from Gids and indirect profile will collectively decide the trust level on behalf of voting scheme given in Table 4.

Table 4. Trust Level Generated By Global Detection Engine.

| Node Id | Trust Level |
|---------|-------------|
| A | 2/5 |
| B | 3/5 |
| C | 4/5 |
| D | 2/5 |
| E | 1/5 |

Feature Selection in the area of intrusion detection can be found in [27, 28], where standard feature selection techniques (forward / backward search, beam search or sequential search) are applied in combination with decision trees and keyword based IDS.

3.2. Simulation environment

Opnet Modeler is used for simulation; and Simulation Area is 1 Sq. Kilometer, there are 21 MANET workstations; with random mobility of (0-20) m/s, following a trajectory during simulation Trajectory 5 (a predefined trajectory in Opnet) shows in Fig. 3 as white lines, all nodes are AODV enabled, sending the Route Request for mobile node 20. Figure 3 shows the environment of simulation. Simulation parameters at a glance are given in Table 5. To apply Black Hole attack, AODV parameters for normal & malicious nodes are given in Table 6, MANET Traffic² generated parameters for normal and malicious nodes are given in Table 7.

Initially simulation is carried out without malicious node then one malicious node is inserted in the network in this environment node 5³ is the malicious node and performance of the system is compared with and without malicious node.

Various features are generated after the simulation but few of them can be considered for further evaluation, which are used in Section 3.4. Performance evaluation of network without malicious node and with malicious node can be measured but they are not required in this paper because it is focused on designing of Intrusion detection system.




Fig. 3. Simulation Environment.

Table 5. Simulation Parameters at a Glance.

| Parameters | Value |
|------------------|----------------------|
| Simulation Area | 1000*1000(in meters) |
| Simulation Time | 3600 Sec |
| Nodes | 21 |
| Mobility | (0-20)m/sec (Random) |
| Distribution | Random |
| Trajectory | Trajectory-5 |
| Routing Protocol | AODV |

²It is called as MANET Traffic because in Mobile Adhoc Network in place of Application layer we have Manet Traffic Generation layer.

³we can insert more than one malicious node it will disturb the network but we are focused only to gather the statistics generated by the malicious node whether it is one or more than one it does not have impact on our aim.

Table 6. AODV Parameters for Malicious and Normal Node.

| Parameters | Value (Normal Node) | Value (Malicious Node) |
|---|------------------------|---------------------------|
| Route Discovery Parameters | Default | Custom Level |
| Route Request Retries | 5 | 0 |
| Route Request Rate Limit (Packets/Sec) | 10 | 0 |
| Gratuitous Route Reply Flag | Enabled | Enabled |
| Destination only Flag | Enabled | Enabled |
| Acknowledgement Required | Enabled | Enabled |
| Active Route Timeout | 3 | 3 |
| Hello Interval | Uniform (1,1.1) | Uniform (1,1.1) |
| Net Diameter | 35 | 1000 |
| Timeout Buffer | 2 | 0 |
| TTL | Default | Default |
| Packet Queue Size (packets) | Infinity | 0 |

Table 7. MANET Traffic Generation Parameters.

| Parameters | Value (Normal Node) | Value (Malicious Node) |
|---------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Start Time | 10 | 10 |
| Packet Inter Arrival Time | Exponential(1) | Exponential(1) |
| Packet Size | Exponential(1024) bits | Exponential(1024) bits |
| Destination IP Address | Mobile Node 20 (192.168.3.20) | Self (192.168.3.5) |

3.3. Support vector machine

In this research SVM is used for solving learning, classification and prediction. Support vector machines (SVMs) are learning systems that use a hypothesis space of linear functions in a high-dimensional feature space, trained with a learning algorithm from optimization theory. This learning strategy, introduced by Vapnik [29], is a very powerful method that has been applied in a wide variety of applications. The basic SVM deals with two-class problems in which the data are separated by a hyper plane defined by a number of support vectors. Support vectors are a subset of training data used to define the boundary between the two classes.

3.4. Feature extraction

Following features [30, 31] can be extracted on behalf of above simulation for training and classification using SVM^{light} [32] for prediction and checking the accuracy of the system when black hole attack is applied. From the Simulation carried out in Section 3.3 visualized form is given in Figs. 4, 5 and 6 and statistics generated are exported to spreadsheet for analysis, audit data file generated using these features can be accessed from *Appendix A*.

- *Ratio of Routing Traffic Received (RRTR) = (Total Routing Traffic Received by malicious node / Total Routing Traffic Sent by complete N/W) × 100;*
- *Ratio of Routing Traffic Sent (RRTS) = (Routing Traffic sent by Malicious Node / Routing Traffic Received by Malicious Node) × 100;*
- *Ratio of Packet Drop (RPD) = (Packet Drop by Malicious Node / Total Packet Drop in N/W) × 100.*




Fig. 4. Total Routing Traffic Sent by the Network and Routing Traffic Received by the Malicious Node.




Fig. 5. Traffic Forwarded by Malicious Node.




Fig. 6. Total Packet Drop by the Network and Packet Drop by the Malicious Node.

4. Results and Validation

From the simulation carried out in Section 3, it is cleared that in the presence of malicious node performance of the system degraded and overhead increases. Binary classification is used for detecting the Intruders activity for Black Hole attack. For Training & Testing, Operating System UBUNTU 9.10 & P IV Dual core based machine is used. Audit (Training & Testing) data is formatted into svm light data format before classification and testing.

```
For Training data set (commands used in training and testing)
$ ./svm_learn -c <value> -g <value> <i/p file> <model file>
For Testing the testing data set
$ ./svm_classify <test file> <model file> <prediction file>
```

Model file generated after training of training data set is confidence value generated by SVM^{LIGHT}, which is used to test the given test data set for prediction, Accuracy shows the True positive generated by detection engine. Accuracy generated above is on behalf of different values considered for C & γ parameters [29], and linear, radial & Sigmoidal functions are used. Tables 8 and 9 show the result of training and testing. The prediction file generated is a confidence file for testing data set on behalf of this we can predict whether the node is an intruder or a normal node. Model file generated is a detection engine which can be deployed in Intrusion detection system.

Table 8. Trainig Data Set.

| Input Features | Train Data- Set | Function | Parameters (C, γ) | CPU Run Time (Sec) | Mis-Classified | Support Vector |
|----------------|-----------------|-----------|---------------------------|--------------------|----------------|----------------|
| 3 | 3568 | LINEAR | DEFAULT | 153.27 | 92 | 273 |
| 3 | 3568 | LINEAR | 0.5,0.5 | 36.39 | 1248 | 14 |
| 3 | 3568 | LINEAR | 1.0,0.5 | 2.90 | 2321 | 15 |
| 3 | 3568 | LINEAR | 1.0,1.0 | 13.07 | 2321 | 15 |
| 3 | 3568 | LINEAR | 2.0,1.0 | 2.89 | 2321 | 14 |
| 3 | 3568 | RADIAL | DEFAULT | 2.36 | 56 | 938 |
| 3 | 3568 | RADIAL | 0.5,0.5 | 1.87 | 52 | 814 |
| 3 | 3568 | RADIAL | 1.0,0.5 | 2.17 | 39 | 792 |
| 3 | 3568 | RADIAL | 1.0,1.0 | 3.41 | 40 | 920 |
| 3 | 3568 | RADIAL | 2.0,1.0 | 2.67 | 37 | 900 |
| 3 | 3568 | Sigmoidal | DEFAULT | 1.44 | 1247 | 2494 |
| 3 | 3568 | Sigmoidal | 0.5,0.5 | 1.54 | 1247 | 2494 |
| 3 | 3568 | Sigmoidal | 1.0,0.5 | 1.36 | 1247 | 2494 |
| 3 | 3568 | Sigmoidal | 1.0,1.0 | 1.39 | 1247 | 2494 |
| 3 | 3568 | Sigmoidal | 2.0,1.0 | 1.47 | 1247 | 2494 |

Table 9. Test Data Set.

| Input Features | Test Data Set | Correct | Incorrect | Accuracy | Precision/Recall |
|----------------|---------------|---------|-----------|----------|------------------|
| 3 | 3568 | 3476 | 92 | 97.42 | 99.78%/96.25% |
| 3 | 3568 | 2320 | 1248 | 65.02 | 65.05%/99.91% |
| 3 | 3568 | 1247 | 2321 | 34.95 | 50%/0.09% |
| 3 | 3568 | 1247 | 2321 | 34.95 | 50%/0.09% |
| 3 | 3568 | 1247 | 2321 | 34.95 | 50%/0.09% |
| 3 | 3568 | 3512 | 56 | 98.43 | 98.63%/98.97% |
| 3 | 3568 | 3516 | 52 | 98.54 | 98.84%/98.92% |
| 3 | 3568 | 3529 | 39 | 98.91 | 99.39%/98.92% |
| 3 | 3568 | 3528 | 40 | 98.88 | 99.35%/98.92% |
| 3 | 3568 | 3531 | 37 | 98.96 | 99.39%/99.0% |
| 3 | 3568 | 2321 | 1247 | 65.05 | 65.05%/100% |
| 3 | 3568 | 2321 | 1247 | 65.05 | 65.05%/100% |
| 3 | 3568 | 2321 | 1247 | 65.05 | 65.05%/100% |
| 3 | 3568 | 2321 | 1247 | 65.05 | 65.05%/100% |
| 3 | 3568 | 2321 | 1247 | 65.05 | 65.05%/100% |

5. Conclusions and Future Work

In this paper, True positive will be reported very fast in Lids & Friend list generated by Lids will be sent to the Gids module for further investigation. Global Detection Engine will generate the friend list according to trust level, higher the trust level of the node may be used for other different processes like routing, and deciding the cluster head for scalable adhoc networks. Feature extracted for Routing parameters and MANET Traffic generation parameters can be used for different routing protocols. For detection engine machine learning algorithm Support Vector Machine is used which is light weighted and considered best among the supervised learning algorithms, prediction (accuracy) generated by the SVM for input features and different values of C & γ to stabilized the system for given training and testing data sets are satisfactory. We will use the model file generated by the function at which accuracy is higher for final deployment of the detection engine. Future work can be included to extract the features from routing & MANET Traffic parameters for identifying the attacks possible in Adhoc network and to generate the model file and testing that model file in different scenarios and finally deploying the detection engine in node models for intrusion detection system.

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Appendix- A

The supporting files (Training & Testing data set) generated after simulation and used for designing of detection engine can be requested from above mentioned email.